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Articles
THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN CULTURAL PROPERTY:
A PRACTITIONER'S VIEW-WAR STORIES AND
MORALITY TALES
LAWRENCE M. KAYE*
I am privileged to have litigated some of the earliest and most
noteworthy cases involving the repatriation of cultural property. In
this age of changing international boundaries, cases that address
the recovery of art, artifacts and cultural property often implicate a
variety of fascinating yet complex non-art related issues. Practition-
ers must be prepared to recognize and address these issues. Since
questions of recovery and repatriation necessarily have interna-
tional implications, prudent counsel must not only examine the
evolving case law in the United States, but also consider relevant
international developments like the UNIDROIT Convention.1
Notwithstanding these complexities, the fundamental rule that
underlies all stolen art cases in the United States is simple: no one,
not even a good faith purchaser, can obtain good title to stolen
property.2 All fifty states accept and apply this simple rule as a fun-
damental tenet of property law. Thus, cases involving the recovery
of stolen art are, in essence, simple replevin actions.
Despite the conceptual simplicity of the cause of action, the
cases that arise are a practitioner's dream. My own career in this
fascinating field began in the late 1960s. At that time, I participated
as a summer associate in a case in which the Weimar Museum, lo-
cated in the former East Germany, sought to recover two portraits
by Albrecht Dfarer stolen at the end of World War II. My initial
assignment was to assess the impact of a possible suggestion of in-
terest by the U.S. Government on the issue of whether the Federal
* Member of the law firm of Herrick, Feinstein in New York. The opinions
expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of any
clients the author has represented. Mr. Kaye expresses his appreciation to Lucille
A. Roussin, an associate at the firm, for her assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
(Rome, 24 June 1995) (visited Feb. 17, 1998) <http:\\www.agora.stm.it\
unidroitenglishconventions\c-cult.htnm> [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
2. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 15, at 93-94 (5th ed. 1984).
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Republic of Germany, the named plaintiff, could represent the in-
terests of all the German people pending the unification of the two
Germanys. Little did I know at the time that the case would take
some fifteen years to wind its way through the courts and that I
would continue to work on the matter as a partner in the firm.
We won the case and the paintings are now hanging on the
walls of the Weimar Museum. The process, however, required us to
confront issues such as the non-recognition doctrine, choice of law,
"renvoi," state succession, the German doctrine of prescription
(known as "Ersitzung"), s military law, sovereign immunity, the act
of state doctrine and the like. Although these issues were all perti-
nent to the case, the decision was ultimately based on a more mun-
dane issue, the New York statute of limitations.4
The Dfirer case underscores the importance of the statute of
limitations in the current framework of art recovery law. The issue
is rendered more complex by the fact that cultural objects are often
discovered abroad long after the thefts occurred at home. By that
time, the cultural objects are usually in the hands of a good faith
purchaser who has no privity to the thieves. The variety of statute
of limitations rules that different states apply heightens the poten-
tial for uncertainty. These state statutes of limitations range from
the "demand and refusal" rule, 5 to discovery rules, 6 to specific legis-
lation that sets forth limitation periods for a stolen artifact or art-
3. See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 845
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). Under the German law doc-
trine of "Ersitzung," "title to moveable property may be obtained by a good faith
acquisition of the property plus possession of it in good faith, and without notice
of a defect in title, for the statutory period of ten years from the time the rightful
owner loses possession." Id. at 845.
4. See id. at 830-33. Other issues relevant to art recovery claims include ques-
tions relating to the identity of the object sought to be recovered, the find site of
the object and the legal basis for the plaintiffs claim for return. See generally Law-
rence M. Kaye, The Future of the Past: Recovering Cultural Property, 4 CARDOZOJ. INT'L
& COMP. L. 23 (1996). In replevin cases plaintiffs have also asserted RICO claims
and state consumer protection law claims. See Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners,
797 F. Supp. 64, 66-68 (D. Mass. 1992).
5. See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 848. "The legal principle underlying the ['de-
mand and refusal' rule] ... is that the bona fide purchaser's possession is initially
lawful, and only becomes unlawful once he has refused, upon demand, to return
the property to the true owner." Id. The statute of limitations does not start to run
until there has been a demand and a refusal. See id. This ensures that "an inno-
cent purchaser of personal property from a wrongdoer shall first be informed of
the defect in his title and have an opportunity to deliver the property to the true
owner before he shall be made liable as a tortfeasor for wrongful conversion." Id.
6. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). The discovery rule is
applicable in the majority of states and holds that the statute of limitations begins
to run when the claimant knew or with reasonable diligence should have known
the whereabouts of his property.
[Vol. 5: p. 5
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work.7 In spite of this variety, the result will often be the same
because the courts will often balance the equities under these dif-
ferent rules in similar ways.
In Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, the court applied the
"demand and refusal" rule." There, two fifteenth century Dfirer
portraits were moved from the Weimar Museum to Schwarzburg
Castle for safekeeping during World War II. 9 The paintings disap-
peared during the occupation of the castle by American troops.
They were discovered some twenty years later in the possession of a
Brooklyn attorney, Edward I. Elicofon. 10 He purchased them in
1946 for $450 from an American serviceman who appeared at
Elicofon's home and claimed that he had bought the paintings in
Germany. I" The identity of the portraits was fortuitously revealed
when a friend of Elicofon's, who had seen the paintings in his
house, happened to recognize them in a newly published book on
stolen German art works. 12
Under the New York "demand and refusal" rule, a plaintiff has
three years to commence a lawsuit to recover stolen property in the
possession of a bona fide purchaser.13 The period begins to run
from demand and refusal. The demand and refusal occurs when
the true owner demands return of the property from the possessor
and the possessor refuses that demand. In Elicofon, the limitations
period began to run in 1966 when Elicofon held a press conference
to announce his discovery of the stolen works and was immediately
confronted with demands for their return. 14 Three parties made
requests for their return: the Weimar Museum, which was later
found by the court to be an instrumentality of the Government of
East Germany; the Hereditary Grand Duchess of Saxony-Weimar-
7. CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(West Supp. 1996). Section 338(c) provides
that an action must be commenced within three years:
[F]or taking, detaining, or injuring any goods or chattels, including ac-
tions for the specific recovery of personal property. The cause of action in
the case of theft, as defined in Section 484 of the Penal Code, of any
article of historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance is not
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the
article by the aggrieved party, his or her agent, or the law enforcement
agency which originally investigated the theft.
Id.
8. See Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1150.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 830-33.
12. See id.
13. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(3) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1996).
14. See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 846-48.
19981
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Eisenach, who claimed that her husband, the Grand Duke, owned
the paintings; and the Government of West Germany, which
claimed to represent all the German people pending reunification
of Germany. 15 Each of these demands were rejected. 16 Elicofon
attempted to discredit New York's demand and refusal rule and ar-
gued against its applicability to the case.1 7 After four years of hard
fought litigation, the court soundly rejected his position.18
In a more recent New York case, DeWeerth v. Baldinger,19 the
plaintiff was not as fortunate. DeWeerth best illustrates how the com-
plexities of the statute of limitations can impede the return of cul-
tural property. There, Mrs. DeWeerth's father purchased a
painting by Claude Monet in 1908. In 1945, following the depar-
ture of American soldiers who had been quartered in the family's
German estate, the DeWeerth family reported the painting as miss-
ing.20 In 1981, Mrs. DeWeerth's nephew informed her that the
painting was listed in a catalogue published by the Wildenstein Gal-
lery in New York and had been publicly exhibited there.21 The gal-
lery acquired the painting from a Swiss dealer who subsequently
sold it to Mrs. Baldinger, a bona fide purchaser, in 1957.22
Immediately after Mrs. DeWeerth learned the identity of the
possessor, she demanded return of the painting. When Mrs. Bald-
inger refused her demand, Mrs. DeWeerth brought suit in federal
15. See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 833. The initial claim was brought in 1969 by
the Federal Republic of Germany. See id. at 830. In March of 1969, the Grand
Duchess of Saxony-Weimar was granted leave to intervene as plaintiff. See id. In
February of 1975, the Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, a museum, intervened as
plaintiff. See id. The Federal Republic of Germany discontinued its claim with prej-
udice. See id. The court dismissed the Grand Duchess' claim; therefore, the only
remaining claim was that of the Kunstsammlungen. See id. at 831.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 847.
18. See id. at 846-47. See also Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1161-64. The issue of the
statute of limitations had already been decided in favor of the Kunstsammlungen.
See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 847. The statute does not begin to run until "a forum
[is] available in which a party may enforce its cause of action," and this was not
until September 1974, when the United States recognized the German Democratic
Republic. See id.
19. 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987); see
also 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994).
20. See id. at 690.
21. See id. at 691.
22. See id.; see generally Lawrence M. Kaye, Cultural Property Theft During War - -
Application of the Statute of Limitations, 5 INT'L ART TRADE AND LAw, Proceedings of
the Fifth Symposium on the Legal Aspects of International Trade in Art: Illicit
Trade in Works of Art, Vienna, 28-30 Sept., 1994 (Paris & New York, 1996).
[Vol. 5: p. 5
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court in New York.23 The trial court, applying the demand and re-
fusal rule, rejected Mrs. Baldinger's statute of limitations defense. 24
Mrs. Baldinger appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.25 The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning
that merely bringing suit within three years of demand and refusal
was not enough; New York law required, in addition, that the plain-
tiff show that she had been reasonably diligent in searching for her
stolen property. This, the court ruled, was what Mrs. DeWeerth had
failed to do.26
Following the Second Circuit's decision, the New York Court of
Appeals revisited the New York statute of limitations issue in Solo-
mon R Guggenheim Found. v. LubelL.27 There, the court held that the
DeWeerth court had incorrectly applied the demand and refusal rule
and reaffirmed the traditional construction. 28 The New York Court
of Appeals held that New York law did not require any showing of
reasonable diligence to overcome the statute of limitations. 29 The
court explained that any alleged delay in conducting a search con-
stitutes a question of fact properly decided at trial, under the equi-
table doctrine of laches. Under this doctrine, the defendant would
have to prove inter alia that prejudice was suffered as a result of the
delay.30
Mrs. DeWeerth returned to the federal trial court and ob-
tained a judgment, based on Guggenheim, ordering Mrs. Baldinger
to surrender the Monet to Mrs. DeWeerth. 31 Mrs. Baldinger, how-
ever, appealed the decision. In an "extraordinary" decision, 32 an
appellate panel reversed the lower court's decision and held that
even though the court had previously erred in applying the New
York statute of limitations, principles of "finality" must prevail.33
23. See DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691.
24. See id. at 694-95.
25. See id.
26. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 107-12 (2d Cir. 1987).
27. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
28. See id at 429-30.
29. See id. at 430.
30. See id. at 429. Laches is defined as the neglect to assert a claim which,
taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
875 (6th ed. 1990).
31. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
32. See Robert A. Barker, The Principles of Finality, 58 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1994).
33. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272 (2d Cir. 1994). The court
said that Mrs. DeWeerth must suffer the consequences of having chosen to com-
mence her suit in federal, rather than state court. See id.
19981
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The court again reversed the lower court's decision.3 4 The final
result was that Mrs. DeWeerth was unable to recover her property
that had been plundered during World War II simply because of
the difficulties that arose from the application of the statute of
limitations.3 5
Some commentators criticize New York's demand and refusal
rule as not being a statute of limitations at all because it permits a
long passage of time between the theft and the suit, thereby mini-
mizing the effect of the defense.3 6 As the Court of Appeals stated in
Guggenheim, however, New York law establishes a presumption in
favor of the interests of the true owner, the victim of the theft, over
those of the bona fide purchaser.3 7 The Guggenheim decision
presents a workable rule for two principal reasons. First, the bona
fide purchaser is in a position to avoid the sale from a possibly ques-
tionable source. Before consummating the purchase, he or she can
make due inquiry into such matters as the seller's reputation, the
validity or existence of provenance documents and the availability
of indemnification from the seller. Second, the rule does not, as
some also argue, favor the thief over the bona fide purchaser.38 As
the Elicofon court noted, even if Elicofon had not been a bona fide
purchaser (in other words, if he had known about the theft), he
would have been estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
defense because of his wrongful conduct.3 9 A thief would be
treated likewise under this rule.
The Republic of Turkey (Republic), a nation rich in cultural
treasures, has recently been involved in a number of repatriation
actions. One highly publicized case involved the fabled Lydian
Hoard antiquities, which were recovered in 1993 by the Republic of
Turkey from the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. In the
late 1960s, tumuli (ancient tombs) in Turkey's Usak region that al-
legedly contained treasures of the legendary King Croesus of Lydia,
34. See id.
35. See id at 1272-75.
36. See Alexandre A. Montagu, Recent Cases on the Recovery of Stolen Art-The Tug
of War Between Owners and Good Faith Purchasers Continues, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 75, 101 (1993-94).
37. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y.
1991).
38. See id. The court indicated that there was a lack of consensus as to the
proper procedure for retrieving stolen art. See id. "Some members of the art com-
munity believe that publicizing a theft exposes gaps in security and can lead to
more thefts; the [Guggenheim] museum also argues that publicity often pushes a
missing painting further underground." Id.
39. See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 849.
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss1/2
RECOVERY OF STOLEN CULTURAL PROPERTY
were plundered by local villagers. Lydian noblemen and members
of the royal class were buried in the tombs with gold and silver
pitchers, bowls, incense burners and other precious artifacts, carved
marble sphinxes and wall paintings.
The Republic of Turkey's twenty-five year effort to reclaim the
treasure began shortly after the thefts. When disputes arose
amongst the thieves as to how to divide the spoils, betrayals began
and the police closed in on the homes of the key people involved.
Officials recovered some objects, but most quickly found their way
out of Turkey to foreign dealers, and finally, to the Metropolitan
Museum of Art.40
The Metropolitan Museum of Art neither announced nor dis-
played the acquisition. 41 Rather, the objects were relegated to
storerooms in the museum's basement. Rumors that the treasure
was in the museum began to circulate in the early 1970s, but inquir-
ies by Turkish officials were essentially ignored. Then, in 1984, a
large number of the pieces were put on permanent exhibition by
the museum as part of its so-called East Greek Treasure. 42 As a re-
sult, the Republic was finally able to assert a claim.
In response to the Republic of Turkey's suit to recover the arti-
facts possessed by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the museum
filed a motion to dismiss based on a technicality, the statute of limi-
tations.43 After three years of litigation on this issue alone, the
court, following the ruling in the Guggenheim case, denied the
motion. 44
40. See LAWRENCE M. KAYE & CARLA T. MAIN, The Saga of the Lydian Hoard: From
Usak to New York and Back Again, ANTIQuITIES, TRADE OR BETRAYED: LEGAL, ETHICAL
AND CONSERVATION ISSUES (1995).
41. One of the museum's curators, however, later recalled his excitement at
seeing twenty-three of the objects in 1966, noting that they were the most ex-
traordinary silver objects he had EVER seen.
42. See KAYE & MAIN, supra note 41, at 151; see also Constance Lowenthal, Met
Returns Silver to Turkey, IFAR REPORTS, Oct. 1993, at 3.
43. See Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44,
46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
44. See id. This case presented significant obstacles. The hundreds of objects
at the center of the controversy had never been documented. A team of distin-
guished archaeologists from Turkey and the United States were able to examine
the objects in the museum storeroom and make key stylistic comparisons with the
objects that had been recovered in Turkey. The team also took meticulous mea-
surements which proved that the wall painting fragments were identical in size and
shape to the missing portions on the walls of the tombs from which they came. See
id. In addition, statements from the thieves themselves helped to identify some of
the more memorable objects.
1998]
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In 1993 the case was resolved short of trial and the Lydian
Hoard objects were returned to Turkey. 45 Museum officials still
maintained that the origin of the objects was a shocking revelation,
despite admissions in the museum's own documents that the true
provenance was known at the time of the acquisition.46 Among the
most telling of these documents was the acquisition committee's
minutes approving the second of the museum's three principal
purchases, which noted that the objects being acquired were said to
have come from the same part of Central Anatolia as those ac-
quired earlier. 47
The return of the Lydian Hoard by the Metropolitan Museum
of Art has already had a salutary effect, at least in the United States,
in emphasizing the need for other cultural institutions to vigorously
enforce measures to ensure that treasures will not be acquired with-
out a credible, documented provenance, and to give more
credence to claims by foreign sovereigns than was given in the past.
The recent changes in the acquisition policies of the Getty Museum
aptly illustrate the point.48 The question, however, remains: will
these rules be honored in the breach, as has so often occurred in
the past?
The Republic of Turkey is involved in another case pending in
the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 49 The
Republic is seeking to recover a hoard of ancient Greek and Lycian
silver coins, dating from the 5th century B.C., which it claims were
illegally excavated from a site in Southern Anatolia in 1984.50
Although the case has not yet reached trial, the Republic has won a
number of important legal victories, including a decision by the
court that confirmed the Republic's right to recover the coins
45. Many factors influenced the museum's decision to return the Lydian
Hoard. It is unlikely that the museum finally saw the light and did the right thing,
and more probable that it did not want to hear the upcoming testimony of present
and former museum officials as to what the museum officials knew and when they
knew it. See KAVE & MAIN, supra note 41, at 151.
46. See Carol Vogel, Metropolitan Museum to Return Turkish Art, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1993, at C13. Phillipe de Montebello, the director of the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, stated that the museum learned through the discovery process
"that the museum's records suggested some on the museum staff in the 1960's
were probably aware that their provenance was questionable." Id.
47. See Mark Rose & Ozgen Acar, Turkey's War on the Illicit Antiquities Trade,
ARCHAEOLOGY, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 45, 46-48.
48. See The Getty Retreats from the Antiquities Market, THE ART NEWSPAPER, Dec.
1995, at 1.
49. See Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 797 F. Supp. 64 (D. Mass. 1992);
Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, No. 89-3061-WJS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17032, at *1 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994).
50. See OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032, at *2.
[Vol. 5: p. 5
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under its antiquities laws, provided Turkey proves that the coins in
the defendants' possession came from the hoard.5 1
An analysis of the most recent cases concerning the recovery of
art, antiquities and cultural property reveals some basic truths
about current trends in the law. First, preparation and a good un-
derstanding of the potential issues are essential to deciding whether
to pursue litigation. In Government of Peru v. Johnson,52 the Govern-
ment of Peru brought an action against an art dealer/collector to
recover eighty-nine pre-Columbian artifacts seized by the United
States Customs Service.53 Although Peru contended that the ob-
jects were among several hundred gold artifacts pillaged from a par-
ticular archaeological site in Peru, it could not offer evidence of
identity because the objects had not been inventoried prior to their
removal.54 Apparently, there were no witnesses and no evidence
available to identify the objects, leaving Peru to rely solely on expert
testimony that the objects were "of Peruvian style and culture." 55
The court found this testimony insufficient AND this was the princi-
pal reason that Peru failed to recover the objects. 56
A similar problem arose in Republic of Lebanon v. Sotheby's 7
commonly known as the Sevso Treasure case. At stake was a collec-
tion of Roman silver that once belonged to a Roman general
named Sevso. 58 Three separate nations laid claim to the treasure,
valued at more than $80 million. 59 Lebanon instituted suit after
Lord Northampton of Great Britain, who held the treasure, con-
signed it for sale at an auction in Zurich and arranged to have it
exhibited in New York prior to the auction. 60 Since the pre-auction
materials that were being circulated suggested that the treasure
originated in Lebanon, the Lebanese government filed a claim in
51. See id. at *8.
52. 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affd sub nom. Government of Peru v.
Wendt, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1991).
53. See Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 811-12.
54. See id. at 812.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. 561 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
58. See id. at 566-67; see also Nina R. Lenzer, Comment: The Illicit International
Trade in Cultural Property: Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy
for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 469-71
(1994); Montagu, supra note 37, at 97-100; Patrick Boylan, Treasure Trove with
Strings Attached, THE INDEP. LONDON, Nov. 9, 1993.
59. See David D'Arcy, Shadow of the Sevso Treasure, VANry FAR, Oct. 1993, at
151.
60. See Sotheby's, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 567; see also Montagu, supra note 37, at 97-98.
1998]
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New York to recover the treasure pursuant to Lebanon's law vesting
ownership of all previously undiscovered antiquities in the state. 61
Subsequently, Croatia and the Republic of Hungary inter-
vened, also asserting claims to the treasure. 62 But Lebanon with-
drew its claim prior to trial, apparently because the documents that
suggested that the treasure had been exported from Lebanon were
discredited in the press.63 The introduction of expert and factual
testimony by Croatia and Hungary failed to convince the jury that
the treasure had been discovered in and removed from either
country's territory. As a result, neither country could invoke its na-
tional ownership law as a predicate to establishing a property right
to the treasure.
The arguments from the three competing claimants served
only to remove all of them from contention. Each asserted that the
treasure originated in and was unlawfully removed from its territory
in violation of its ownership laws, based on a vast array of direct and
indirect evidence that was essentially inconsistent. The jury verdict
in favor of Northampton was sustained on appeals by Croatia and
Hungary.64
These decisions underscore the fundamental reality that where
so many of the objects that eventually become the subject of repatri-
ation and recovery cases are looted in the dead of night, from un-
known sites or unexcavated tombs, the questions of geographic
origin and identity become paramount issues. However, in cases
such as these, there are methods to establish identity and findsite;
including the testimony of experts, admissions from the defendants
and other similar evidence. For example, in Autocephalous Greek-Or-
thodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,65 the federal
61. See Sotheby's, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
62. See Montagu, supra note 37, at 98.
63. See Lenzner, supra note 59, at 469, n.1; See Jury Decides Briton Entitled to
Treasure, 57 N.Y. L.J. 2 (1993).
64. See Republic of Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton 1987
Settlement, 610 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); see also Court Decisions - First
Judicial Department, 58 N.Y. L.J. 26 (1994); 2 Nations Lose Claim to Old Silver, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994, at C18; Constance Lowenthal, Sevso Case Ended in New York,
IFAR REPORTS, Nov. 1994, at 4-5; Barbara Hoffman, Sevso Follies of 1994, ARcHAEOL-
oGY, May/June 1994, at 42-43.
65. 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1990). Four early sixth century Byzantine mosaics were stolen from the Kanakaria
church. See id. at 1375. These mosaics were sold to Goldberg, who claimed to have
purchased them in good faith and without knowledge that they were stolen. See id.
at 1376. The uncontradicted evidence that the church owned the mosaics and the
sufficient evidence showing that they were unlawfully removed resulted in a judg-
ment awarding ownership of the mosaics to the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church. See id. at 1397, 1404-05.
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court in Indiana relied on the testimony of eyewitnesses, who had
seen the four sixth century mosaics in the Kanakaria church in Cy-
prus, in coming to the determination that the mosaics had been
stolen from the church. 66
Another issue that must be confronted is ownership and right
to possession. This issue arises most often where the plaintiff is a
sovereign claiming rights in previously undiscovered antiquities sto-
len from under the ground. The foreign sovereign claimant must
establish that a national law gives the state rights in the property at
issue. Although this may appear to be a simple task, it poses a diffi-
cult obstacle because resolution of this issue often involves taking
the depositions of legal experts on both sides and holding hearings
on the meaning of the language of the foreign law.6 7 In Peru v.
Johnson,68 the lower court had a great deal of trouble interpreting
Peru's antiquities laws, which it determined were inadequate and
incomprehensible. 69
The procedure for making requests for the return of stolen
cultural property is a function of legal rules that are being devel-
oped and refined as the number of reported cases increases.
Courts have also recognized the need to take policy considerations
into account. In the Guggenheim case, for example, the policy of
protecting the interests of the true owner was an underpinning of
the decision.70
The thriving illicit market in antiquities directly contributes to
the systematic looting of archaeological sites. There are tales of
smugglers dynamiting entire ancient cities to reach the specific
items they want to market, and stories of the wanton mutilation of
movable antiquities to make them more saleable.71 The potential
66. See id. at 1390. In the Lydian Hoard case, although that matter did not go
to trial, experts were able to match the wall painting fragments in the basement of
the Metropolitan with the portions missing in the tombs from which they were
removed. See Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
67. See Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, No. 89-3061-WJS, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17032, at *3-4 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994).
68. 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
69. See id. at 813.
70. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y.
1991). "To place the burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner and to
foreclose the rights of that owner to recover its property if the burden were not
met would .... encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art." Id.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154,1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
See generally Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 ARTJ. 94
(1969); Clemency Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, 175 SCIENCE 263 (1972);
Rose & Acar, supra note 48, at 46; Nathaniel C. Nash, Erasing the Past/Looters Plunder
Archaeological Ruins, Leaving Little Cultural Heritage Behind, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug.
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for destruction and loss, not only of the objects themselves, but of
essential archaeological and historical data, is unfathomable. De-
spite the efforts of art-rich nations, as long as the illicit market
thrives the looting will persist, as many of the art-rich nations have
limited budgets to protect the thousands of tombs and sites not yet
excavated. Strict adherence by our courts to the legal principles
discussed here, coupled with principled action on the part of muse-
ums, dealers and collectors, will help decrease the flow of looted
artifacts.
The success achieved by foreign claimants in cultural property
cases in the United States has already had a deterrent effect on the
illicit trade in cultural property. Many dealers and museums are ex-
ercising more care and more cooperation. In March 1997, a sev-
enth century B.C. Etruscan ceremonial vase and a set of rare
Villanovan and archaic ceramic wares were returned to Italy by a
New York dealer.72 In July 1996, a first century A.D. torso of the
goddess Artemis was ordered returned to Italy by a New York gal-
lery. The order of forfeiture, issued by United States District Judge
Shira Scheindlin, was the first such order issued under the Conven-
tion on Cultural Property Implementation Act (Convention) in the
Southern District of New York.73
This favorable state of legal affairs in the United States, how-
ever, is by no means sufficient in itself to diminish the flow of illicit
trade in stolen art which gives rise to these cases. Litigation can be
time-consuming and expensive. Many victimized source nations
simply cannot afford to take advantage of the favorable legal frame-
work available in the United States. There will always be profiteers
willing to turn a blind eye to questionable provenance, as well as
collectors who cannot resist the temptation to acquire unique and
valuable stolen works of art.
Moreover, the legal remedies available in other countries, es-
pecially those art-importing members of the European community,
are far less favorable to sovereign claimants and other victims of
29, 1993, at A21; Thomas Meier, Debate Is Fierce over Looting ofAncient Riches, Clues to
the Past, BurFAro NEws, June 18, 1995, at IlF.
72. See American Gallery to Forfeit Etruscan Artifacts, REuTERs N. AM. WIRE, Mar.
27, 1997.
73. See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2613 (1988 & Supp. 1994). This Convention is the enabling legislation for
the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 27 U.S.T.
37, T.I.A.S. no. 8226, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972). SeeAnne C. Cockburn, Stolen Torso
Returned to Italy: Ruling Is the First the Cultural Property Implementation Act, IFAR RE-
PORTS, July/Aug. 1996, at 3.
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cultural property theft. Many of these jurisdictions go out of their
way to protect the bona fide purchaser rather than the victim of the
theft. Often, these jurisdictions fail to encourage due inquiry and
permit bona fide purchasers to obtain good title to stolen cultural
property under a variety of circumstances.74 Also, the statutes of
limitation in these countries are often short and strictly applied. 75
These rules impede the ability to substantially reduce the traffick-
ing in illicit artifacts.
For these reasons, the Republic of Turkey and other victimized
source nations have been active participants in the world commu-
nity's efforts over the last several years to draft a convention under
the auspices of UNIDROIT Convention. 76 The document that
emerged from the diplomatic conference held in June 1995 is a
"conciliatory draft," hammered-out in a last minute effort to save
the otherwise doomed convention by attempting to reconcile the
varied interests of the market and the source nations. Regardless of
its faults, the Convention may yet provide the best opportunity for
improved international cooperation in an effort to reduce the trade
in stolen cultural property.
74. See, e.g., Lyndel V. Prott & P.J. O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, 405-
12 (1989).
75. See id. at 416-20.
76. See generally UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 2.
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